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Rights of Ex-Patients in the Community:
The Next Frontier?t
MICHAEL

L.

PERLIN,

E S Q .*

Perhaps the most significant comment which can be made about the topic
of "rights in the community" is simply, that it is a topic. Although the
"right to treatment" concept is less than two decades old, 1 questions as to
the adequacy of treatment date back, at the least, to the Middle Ages: 2
"right to refuse treatment" theories 3 might appear new or "radical" to
some;4 however, the origins of the concept date back to Blackstone. 5 Of
course, insanity defense questions have plagued the judicial system since
Lord Bracton wrote in the 1200's.6
Yet, the seemingly relatively-innocuous topic of "rights of the mentally
handicapped 7 in the community" was not even conceptualized as a topic
for cocktail party conversation until the past several years;8 although its
recent growth has hardly been meteoric,lJ and in spite of general
backsliding by the United States Supreme Court in the general area of
"rights to services in the community," 10 it has become an area of
significance to all practicing mental health attorneys and to mental health
professionals as well. Hopefully, it will be one of those areas in which
there is general agreement between the two, and, much more importantly,
it is likely that it is the one area in which further rights development will
realistically be one giant step on the rocky and often Sisyphus-like road
towards "normalization" of former patients, as well as a first step
towards the meaningful eradication of the stigma of the label of
"psychiatric patient."
In many ways, of course, the whole bundle of community rights could
not have even come into theoretical existence had not the right to
treatment and least restrictive alternative litigation developed as they
had. Those cases - which firmly entrenched the concepts of both
procedural! I and substantive!2 due process in the legal fabric of mental
health law - were the first legal recognition of the overwhelming and
virtually irreversible burden which saddled persons labeled deviant by the
mental health and judicial systems. Cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt, 13
Wyatt v. Stickney '4 and O'Connor v. Donaldson IS - when read together
- established basic legal principles which would serve as the important
groundwork for future legal developments: there is a constitutional right
to liberty'h (the "natural state of individuals"):'- before one can be
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deprived of that right, the process of deprivation must comport with strict
due process procedures 18 to minimize the risk of error l9 (and to place such
risk on the committing agency, not the person at risk)20 so that
institutionalization is seen as the last resort; 21 if a person is to be
institutionalized, that institutionalization cannot meet constitutional
muster if it does not offer a person a reasonable opportunity to receive
such care and treatment in a humane environment as to enhance that
person's likelihood of being released; 22 while institutionalized, similar
due process concepts should mandate that a person is not stripped of his
other civil rights simply because he is a mental patient;23 in fact, it is
impermissible to presume a person incompetent to manage his affairs
because of his status as a patient. 24
It is equally important to note that decisions such as Wyatt and
Lessard cannot be viewed - even by the most resistant to change - as
aberrant or idiosyncratic. Virtually every post- Wyatt treatment case has
cited it with approval;25 indeed, Wyatt is seen as the progenitor of
virtually all of the "Patients' Bills of Rights"26 which have been enacted
in the past six years, and which the prestigious President's Commission
on Mental Health has urged all states to adopt as well,27 Similarly,
virtually every challenge to commitment procedures based on the Lessard
theory has been successful;28 in the rare instances where challenges to
legislation have been turned back, invariably there has been a revision of
court civil practice rules to comply with Lessard-level mandates. 29
Indeed, in turning down Florida's claim in O'Connor that treatment
issues were not justiciable by courts, the United States Supreme Court
specifically rejected such a notion, pointing out it was "plainly
unacceptable" to suggest that courts are powerless to determine
"adequacy of treatment. "30
As discussed above, of course, this development of mental health rights
law must be seen as a logical culmination of the expansion of such parallel
fields as civil rights, consumer rights, criminal procedure and inmates'
rights: 30A to a large extent, mental health law is at the crossroads of all of
those paths, as an outgrowth of a process by which lawyers have become
able to contribute to "public consciousness of inequities or shortcomings
in the society"30B through" substantive concerns with issues of social
policy." 30e
The logical progression from Brown v. Board of Education 30D to
Gideon v. Wainwright 30E to O'Connor v. Donaidson 30F should thus be
clear. Patients and former patients are merely replicating the experiences
of thousands of other American citizens who have, in recent years, begun
to seek relief through the courts as a means of redressing civil
grievances. 30G Again, it must be underscored that this new court
involvement must be considered in relation to those traditionally
institutionalized in large, public psychiatric hospitals (and thus, those to
be released from such facilities) - the poor, the minorities, the voiceless,
those persons traditionally isolated from the mainstream of the
34
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majoritarian, democratic political system. 30H
This backdrop is significant, of course, for reasons far beyond the
specific issues resolved in the cases in question. It is of incalculable
symbolic value in any attempt to predict how courts will respond to
similar challenges raised on behalf of patients (and former patients) to
practices in the community which deprive them of their civil rights.
Again, this shift in focus was underlined by the Task Force Panel on
Legal and Ethical Issues in its report to the President's Commission on
Mental Health:
[T]he panel anticipates that as our country moves increasingly from
institutional to community based care, it will be important for
advocacy efforts to shift from exposing abuses and deficiencies in
institutions to protecting mentally handicapped persons from a wide
range of deprivations to basic civil rights and privileges that they too
often experience in the community. 31
Although the report is probably unduly optimistic in two of its
assumptions - that abuse and deficiencies in institutions will be reduced
commensurately with reduced institutional populations, and that advocates
will be able to" shift" their efforts from one population to the other - it is
important, nonetheless, as a first serious recognition on the Federal level
that "rights in the community" will continue to grow in importance in
both the immediate and long-term future.
In examining "rights in the community," then, it appears that there are
at least two bundles of issues involved which must be looked at through
slightly different filters: issues which arise directly involving an
individual's status as ex-patient (or as one still receiving psychiatric
services), and those which arise as a corollary to such a status. Although
the legal thories propounded in both types of cases may have similar
bases, and although constitutional due process and equal protection
considerations may apply in all matters, it is clear that, socially and
politically, different variables may be present in the two types of cases.
At the outset, it should be noted that a group of cases has arisen under
the general (if somewhat imprecise and overbroad) rubric of "right to
aftercare." These cases have, by and large, emanated from the right to
treatment litigation, and have focused on the need to extend treatment
rights theories to community settings. The first, and most significant,
arose in Washington, D.C., in the context of the hardly-atypical world of
S1. Elizabeth's Hospital: hundreds of patients, including many elderly
persons, were being improvidently held at the facility because, in the pat
phrase of both the institutional and the community social service
providers: "There's nowhere else for them to gO."3IA In that case, Dixon
v. Weinberger,32 the Federal District Court found that, under D. C. law,
the plaintiffs had a statutory right to aftercare, and that that right had been
violated as a result of the D. C. Government's failure to provide suitable
Rights of Ex-Patients
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alternative facilities for those St. Elizabeth's Hospital patients who no
longer met statutory criteria for hospitalization. 33 The court ruled that
there was a specific affirmative obligation on the part of District officials
to place those patients" determined suitable for placement in alternative
facilities in proper facilities that are less restrictive alternatives to the
hospital ... such alternatives including but not being limited to nursing
homes, foster homes, personal care home's and halfway houses."33A
Although Dixon was originally viewed as, perhaps, another breakthrough
on the level of a Wyatt or a Lessard, it has not yet lived up to that
reputation. In the first instance, bluntly, many of the ordered transfers
simply never took place: although the hospital agreed during the trial that
about 43% of the patients were ready for community living, and although
clinical staff even identified nearly 1300 candidates for deinstitutionalization (out of a population of 2700), hospital officials soon backtracked,
claiming that only 402 of those patients were truly appropriate candidates
for placement. Although many of the original targets for deinstitutionalization remain in the hospital, they have been reclassified as
'" unacceptable for community living because of inappropriate, although
not dangerous, social behavior such as wandering, disrobing, throwing
temper tantrums, and verbally abusing others."34 Again, the special
HE W assistant secretary in charge of improving mental health services at
St. Elizabeth's has repeated, "Where are we going to put all these
people?"35
This inaction, it should be noted, has not gone uncommented upon.
Inadequacy of compliance by Federal officials was the basis for a specific
recommendation by the President's Commission's Task Force discussed
above, that" HE W promptly take all actions necessary to implement the
Dixon ruling and to extend its application to all relevant Federal
programs. "35A As of the writing of this paper, of course, this
recommendation has not been implemented. Not surprisingly, attorneys
for the Dixon patients are back in court on the question of the
acceptability of the implementation plan finally drawn by D.C. and
federal officials. One example of the conflict: HEW wants to convert
vacant buildings of the old D.C. Children's Hospital into a "multiservice
facility" for released patients; such a facility, its officials assert, "would
not be an institution ... but a protected environment to help its residents
adjust to life in the community."36 Again, not surprisingly, the patients'
lawyers oppose the idea: "To concentrate former mental patients in large
vacant structures of a kind and size not commonly used by other members
of the community and to isolate them from normal contacts that they
would otherwise have, may well obstruct their reintegration into the
community. "37 The books, then, are hardly closed on the Dixon case. 38
Another case brought on the same general basis as Dixon was settled
successfully in 1978 in Maine, when officials of that state signed a
settlement decree in Federal Court affirming the right of released
mentally handicapped persons to receive, in the community, "habilitation,
36
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including medical treatment, education, training and care, suited to their
needs, regardless of age, degree of retardation or handicapped condition. "39
Although attorneys for plaintiffs in the case hailed the decision as "the
next important step"40 beyond the traditional right-to-treatment decisions,
the ink is still barely dry on the decree, so it cannot yet be determined
what empirical substantive effect it will have on whether state officials
simply will, in fact, do what they have promised to do in court. 40A Similar
litigation has been concluded in Massachusetts,40B but again, it is still not
yet clear if the state is complying.
Although it is not specifically articulated in either the District of
Columbia or Maine cases, it appears that the decisions were premised, to
some extent at least, on the legal theory which suggests that in situations
where further inpatient confinement is "predictably anti therapeutic,
further confinement must be deemed to effect a continuing violation of
due process."4J That theory is the underpinning of the arguments
forwarded by plaintiffs and amicus in a similar New Jersey case on the
right to aftercare 42 which has been awaiting trial for over three years;
however, as of this date, there is still no indication of a trial date being set. 42A
Probably the most significant decision in this line, however, will prove
to be an action brought on behalf of residents of a large Pennsylvania
institution in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital. 43
where a Federal District Court held that the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution "prohibit[ ed] the segregation of the
retarded44 in an isolated institution such as Pennhurst where habilitation
does not measure up to minimally adequate standards,"45 and ordered
that" immediate steps be taken to [thus] remove the retarded residents
from Pennhurst,"46 commensurate with the exercise of ., great caution
and care ... to make certain that each and every retarded resident who
is removed from Pennhurst can be accommodated in a community
facility which will provide minimally adequate habilitation. "47 Again,
although plaintiffs' attorney's prediction that the Halderman case will
"spell the end of more than a century of incarceration for the retarded in
the United States"48 is highly speculative, it is clear that the opinion is a
drastically new and unprecedented approach - based upon a "right to
non-discriminatory habilitation"49 (a theory arrived at by analogizing
from such landmark civil rights cases as Brown v. Board of Education SO
which outlawed racial segregation in public school systems) - which will
undoubtedly spawn similar, imitative suits in other jurisdictions. When
this happens, it is likely that - at least on a symbolic and theoretical level
- the decision will have the same impact on deinstitutionalization issues
that Wyatt 5 J had on matters involving treatment: it will .. repaint the
landscape for all time. "52
Aftercare cases, of course, are not the only area of community rights
directly involving the ex-patient's status as a former patient, especially if
he/she is still receiving psychiatric services at, e.g.• a community mental
health center. There has been little litigation yet brought on behalf of such
Rights of Ex·Patlents
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patients; this probably due to a combination of factors, including lack of
access to counsel (those few governmentally-funded programs that exist
concentrating primarily on representation of institutionalized patients or
persons threatened by a loss of liberty)53 and to a traditional (still
common) feeling that, with spaces at such community facilities at such a
premium, once a patient was discharged from a hospital to a community
center, helshe would not want to "rock the boat" and imperil hislher
preferred status as outpatient. 54 It is inevitable, though, that with each
year, more actions will be brought to vindicate rights directly related to
one's status as a participant in such facilities.
The few cases actually litigated have concentrated on issues involving
the records of a patient's stay at an institution: the degree of
confidentiality required, and the applicability of expungement statutes to
such records. In a consent decree in one Pennsylvania case, a federal
court ruled that city outpatient clinics must adopt stringent rules "with
respect to maintaining the confidentiality of the medical records of all
persons who have undergone or are presently undergoing treatment"55 at
such centers; in another case in that state's local courts, it was ordered
that a former patient was entitled to copies of" all medical records" which
were amassed during his hospitalization at a private inpatient psychiatric
clinic. 56 Similarly, in those states which have enacted expungement laws,
the court trend is generally towards a liberal interpretation of such criteria
as "cured" or "restored to reason "56A so as to expand the potential class
of ex-patients who might avail themselves of the prophylactic effects of
the statutes; in fact, some legislatures are now amending such laws to
include patients" in substantial remission" as part of the class that can
seek such expungement. 56B
The tabula, however, is particularly rasa in the knottier area of
treatment rights: do community-based patients, e.g., have the right to
"minimally adequate treatment"57 in such facilities? Do they have the
right to refuse treatment?58 If they do receive treatment, can the facility
exert the sanction of expulsion (or, in the increasingly common fact
pattern through which a person is diverted to a Community Mental Health
Center as a probationary term in lieu of jail for a petty offense or
misdemeanor, if hel she refuses treatment, can hel she be sent to jail on the
theory that hel she has violated a term of probation)? Are community
facilities governed by state enacted "Patients' Bills of Rights" which
establish rights to due process hearings prior to the involuntary
imposition of electroshock? Can First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and expression be abrogated by such centers? If a therapist feels it
is detrimental to the patient's best interest, can. hel she contact the local
welfare or unemployment office and suggest the patient be denied
benefits? Although these questions are all couched hypothetically, it is
clear that all of these circumstances have arisen in the recent past. It is
not a particularly radical prediction to suggest that many of them will be
the subject of litigation in the ensuing years.
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These issues to the side, however, there remains the entire bundle of
rights in the community which arises in contexts corollary to the subject's
status as ex-patient. Although there is, at this point in time, at least, "no
presently recognized right to services"59 for any American citizens in the
community, case after case has been brought vindicating the civil rights
and basic rights of citizenship of individual mentally handicapped persons
(and classes of such persons). In this context, the mental health lawyer
takes the view that the central issue is one of "welfare entitlements" and
that, based on the theory of recent United States Supreme Court
developments in this area,60 what used to be characterized as
"governmental largesse" should be considered a right rather than a
privilege: within this framework, the lawyer's role is to maximize the
gains of otherwise-qualified persons in demanding their right to such
entitlements. 6oA Importantly, there is usually a high degree of consensus
between mental health advocates and service providers on the need for
vindication of such rights and on the importance of such rights to
formerly- hospitalized persons. 60B
Thus, courts have outlawed status discrimination against former
patients in such areas as voting rights,6l drivers' license suspensions,62
zoning,63 employment,64 and welfare65 and SSI benefits.66 It is true that these
decisions have been generally idiosyncratic and reactive; however, they
are most likely an important first step on a legal path which will
eventually see litigation on behalf of former patients in all areas of
community living, including such uncharted areas as professional
licensure, admission to institutions of higher education, and availability of
adequate housing. 66A New approaches to litigation will also be necessary
in such areas as discrimination by nursing homes against former
patients 66B and extension of the concept of" fair share" housing plans to
the mentally handicapped: 66c creativity must be the byword.
In addition to litigation, former patients and their advocates have been
turning to legislatures to enact bills similarly banning such status
discrimination. Many "Patients' Bills of Rights" now include blanket
antidiscrimination language. 66D Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 67 further appears to open new doors in the areas of recreation,
employment, education and social services (although the issue of whether
that section implies a so-called ., private cause of action"68 is still not
settled). The President's Commission's Task Force recommendation that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be amended to include persons with mentally
handicapping conditions as a protected c1ass 69 has stlil not been acted
upon by Congress; yet individual states are just beginning to amend their
counterpart state antidiscrimination laws to include the mentally
handicapped and/or the former patient. 70 Again, it is still not clear what
ultimate effect these statutory changes will have on the way such persons
are treated in the community.
Finally, of course, it is acknowledged by all concerned that litigation,
legislation, executive orders and court rules will have little empirical
Rights of Ex·Patients
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effect if nothing is done to attempt to reverse the pattern of social and
cultural stigma as a result of which discrimination persists and" a large
portion of the public 'continues to be frightened and repelled by the notion
of mental illness,' "70A a stigma specifically acknowledged recently by the
United States Supreme Court in the Addington (burden of proof)
case. 70AA The President's Commission aptly noted that this stereotypic
stigmatization was a major stumbling block in the path of meaningful
community treatment, 70B noting, again accurately, that "people with
chronic mental disabilities are the most rejected and stigmatized of all,
particularly because disproportionate numbers of them are also elderly,
poor or members of racial or ethnic minorities."70c As the focus on legal
issues shifts in some significant part to the community, these issues cry
out for greater clarification and understanding.
What is clear, however, is this: the litigation and legislation discussed
above have helped create a climate in which the question of "rights in the
community" can no longer be seen as a merely intellectual abstraction or
topic for law review commentary; that new climate should help rid society
of the heretofore prevalent atmosphere in which, in the words of former
Assistant United States Attorney General, Patricia Wald, the handicapped person has been perceived as "someone to whom attention need
not be paid,'>?l and should replace it with a new sense that each person,
whether or not a former patient, is ensured that" equal access to justice
which} is the cornerstone of the American judicial system. "72
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Editor's Note: Since this paper was originally prepared, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the District Court's
decision in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital. 612 F.
2d 84 (3 Cir. 1979). Whereas the lower court had held that the equal
protection clause supported a right to non-discriminatory habilitation
"prohibit[ ing] the segregation of the retarded in an isolated institution
such as Pennhurst where habilitation does not measure up to minimally
adequate standards," the Circuit eschewed the Constitution and based its
holding instead on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, ruling that, as part of the law's guarantee of treatment in the
least restrictive environment, "the clear preference of the Act. . . is
deinstitutionalization," and that institutionalization of the retarded would
be appropriate only in those "probably comparatively rare [cases where J
adequate habilitation could not be accomplished in any setting less
restrictive than an institution."
The Circuit's only major modification of the District Court's decision
reversed that portion of the lower court's order which ruled that
Pennhurst must be entirely closed, reasoning that, as "there may be some
individual patients who because of advanced age, profound degree of
retardation, special needs or for some other reason, will not be able to
adjust to life outside of an institution and thus will be harmed by such a
change," and ordered a remand for "individual determinations as to the
appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each patient," noting that,
on remand, the court "should engage a presumption in favor of placing
individuals in [community facilities J. It simultaneously warned that, if the
facility is to remain open, "it must be dramatically improved so as to
provide adequate habilitation," and cautioned that, before transfers could
be made to community facilities, there must be "assurances that the
sanitary, staffings and program deficiencies which were found at
Pennhurst [will not be] duplicated on a smaller scale in [the community
facilities] ... where changes in the size of buildings and their location are
not enough to meet the statutory requirements."
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
and has stayed only that portion of the order which would have allowed
transfers of Pennhurst patients to the community over the objections of
the residents' parents. Oral argument is scheduled for the 1980-1981
United States Supreme Court term.
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